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A large literature has argued that different types of capital flows have different consequences for macroeconomic stability. By distinguishing between foreign direct investment and portfolio and other investments, this paper studies the effects of the composition of capital inflows on output volatility. The paper develops a simple empirical model which, under certain conditions that hold in the data, yields three key testable implications. First, output volatility should depend positively on the volatilities of both foreign direct investment and portfolio and other inflows. Second, output volatility should be an increasing function of the correlation between This paper is a product of the Macroeconomics and Growth Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at Vegh@econ.umd.edu. both kinds of inflows. Third, output volatility should be a decreasing function of the share of foreign direct investment in total capital inflows, for low values of that share. The data provide strong support for all three implications, even after controlling for other factors that may influence output volatility, and after dealing with potential endogeneity problems. These findings call attention to the importance of taking into account the synchronization and composition of capital flows for output stabilization purposes, as opposed to just focusing on the volatility of each component of capital flows.
Introduction
There is by now a large literature that has focused on the e¤ects of foreign direct investment (F DI) on growth. The overall consensus appears to be that, provided that the right economic environment is in place, F DI will indeed stimulate growth. 1 Much less attention, if at all, has been paid to the link between capital in ‡ows volatility and output volatility. 2 In particular, there has been little formal analysis of the idea -often found in policy circles -that F DI should be encouraged because it should lead to lower output volatility. As the logic goes, F DI is more stable than other sources of capital in ‡ows, most notably portfolio and other investments (OT R), and therefore should be encouraged in order to ensure a less volatile level of domestic output. This paper tackles head on the question of whether more F DI leads to a less volatile level of output. 3 To organize the discussion and provide a guide to the empirical analysis, we …rst develop a simple empirical model of the relationship between output and capital in ‡ows. The model draws on standard portfolio theory in which the volatility of an investor's portfolio depends on the volatilities of the underlying investments. We show that output volatility depends not only on the volatility of F DI and OT R but also on the correlation between F DI and OT R and the share of F DI in total capital in ‡ows.
The model calls attention to some important caveats that need to be taken into account for some commonly-held beliefs to be true. For example, if would seem intuitively obvious 1 See, among others, Alfaro et al (2007 Alfaro et al ( , 2010 , Borenzstein et al (1998) , and Carkovic and Levine (2005) . 2 A related question -the potential bene…cial e¤ects of FDI in reducing the frequency of crises and/or sudden stops -has been addressed in Fernandez-Arias and Hausmann (2001) and Levchencko and Mauro (2007) . For an early, skeptical look at the notion that long-term ‡ows may be stabilizing, see Claessens, Dooley, and Warner (1995) . Using …rm level data, Alfaro and Chenz (2012) analyze the role of FDI on establishment performance before and after the global …nancial crisis of 2008.
3 At a …rm level and for European countries, Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, and Volosovych (2010) …nd a positive e¤ect of foreign ownership on volatility of …rms'outcomes.
that lower F DI volatility should lead to lower output volatility. This is not, however, necessarily the case. In fact, if the correlation between F DI and OT R is negative, then lower F DI volatility will increase output volatility because F DI cannot provide as much insurance against the volatility of OT R. By the same token, another "obvious" idea -that a higher share of F DI should lead to lower output volatility -is only true in the model if the actual share of F DI in total capital in ‡ows is below the share of F DI that minimizes overall output variability.
We use the model to derive three key testable implications:
If the correlation between F DI and OT R is zero or positive, output volatility should also depend positively on F DI volatility and OT R volatility.
Output volatility should be an increasing function of the correlation between F DI and OT R.
Output volatility should be a decreasing function of the share of F DI in total capital in ‡ows, particularly when its initial value is low. We test the model's predictions using a sample of 59 countries for the period 1970-2009. 4 For this purpose, we construct …ve-year non-overlapping series of volatilities and other portfolio and macroeconomic variables. Our empirical …ndings strongly support our model's implications.
We control for other possible determinants of output volatility, such as government spending volatility, terms of trade volatility, and country instability. We address endogeneity concerns by using three sets of instruments: (i) …ve-year non-overlapping lags of portfolio vari-ables, (ii) gravity-based portfolio variables aiming at capturing regional/location e¤ects, and (iii) …ve-year non-overlapping lags of de jure and de facto measures of restrictions on crossborder …nancial transactions. Our main …ndings continue to hold even after controlling for other factors and using instrumental variables.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops our simple empirical model. Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 presents the econometric estimates. Section 5 concludes. An appendix develops a theoretical model that formalizes the tight link between capital in ‡ows and output.
Empirical model
To organize ideas and guide our empirics, this section develops a simple empirical model of the relation between output volatility and capital in ‡ows volatility. Consider a small open economy with the following technology:
where Y is output, A is a positive technological parameter, and K is a (tradable) capital good. Let p be the international price of this capital good. 5
The capital stock consists of this period's addition to the existing capital stock:
5 This price could also be interpreted as a rental price. For the purposes of our analysis, we will assume that this price does not change over time.
4
Assume that the purchase of this period's capital good must be fully …nanced by capital in‡ows, either in the form of foreign direct investment (F DI) or portfolio and other investments (OT R). 6 Formally,
Solving for p and substituting in (1), we obtain
where
denotes total capital in ‡ows andÃ A=p. Output is thus a linear function of total capital in ‡ows. 7
Let Y and T F denote the means of output and total capital ‡ows, respectively. It then follows from (2) that
Output volatility is thus an increasing function of capital in ‡ows volatility. To proceed further, we need to impose more structure. Speci…cally, let us assume that the stochastic 6 We are abstracting, of course, from domestic savings as a source of …nancing in order to focus exclusively on the e¤ects of volatility of foreign …nancing on domestic output. 7 This very tight link between output and capital ‡ows is the key assumption behind our empirical model. (While helpful to organize the empirical work, what folows below is, formally, a mechanical elaboration of this main idea in a stochastic setting and involves no implicit theorizing.) To provide some theoretical basis for this assumption, the appendix develops a simple theoretical framework with heterogenous …rms which delivers an equilibrium relationship between F DI and OT R, on the one hand, and output on the other. In this context, the appendix shows how ‡uctuations in, for instance, the cost of long-term …nancing leads to ‡uctuations in output, F DI and OT R.
5
processes for F DI and OT R take the following multiplicative form:
OT R = OT R (1 + " OT R ) ;
where F DI and OT R are the means of F DI and OT R, respectively, " F DI s N 0; 2 F DI , " OT R s N 0; 2 OT R , and " F DI and " OT R are jointly normally distributed. For further reference, let denote the correlation between " F DI and " OT R . 8
Let denote the share of F DI in total capital in ‡ows; that is,
OT R = (1 ) T F ;
where T F is the mean of T F:Since T F is the sum of F DI and OT R, it will inherit the multiplicative stochastic structure of F DI and OT R. To see this, substitute (5) and (6) into (3), and use (7) and (8), to obtain
Hence,
8 The normality assumption is not essential for our results to go through.
6 From (2), 2 Y =Ã 2 2 T F . Using (9), we can express output volatility as
This equation thus relates output volatility ( 2 Y ) to the volatility of foreign direct investment ( 2 F DI ), the volatility of portfolio and other investments ( 2 OT R ), the correlation between F DI and OT R ( ), and the share of F DI in total capital in ‡ows ( ).
Even though the model is extremely simple, expression (10) already warns us that some commonly-held beliefs regarding the bene…cial role of F DI in bringing about lower output volatility in emerging markets are in fact not obvious on closer examination. In particular,
we can see that while equation (4) indicates that lower capital in ‡ows volatility does imply lower output volatility, equation (10) tells us that whether lower F DI volatility will actually translate into lower output volatility depends on the correlation between F DI and OT R. As will become clear below, if < 0, lower F DI volatility could actually lead to higher output volatility! Also, the e¤ect of on output volatility is, in principle, ambiguous. In fact, it is possible that a larger share of F DI will lead to higher, rather than lower, output volatility.
This suggests that we need to be careful in establishing the conditions under which these ideas may be true and then check in the data if these conditions hold.
To gain insights into expression (10), let us proceed by considering some special cases.
Case 1: Variances of F DI and OT R are the same and the correlation is one (i.e., 2 F DI = 2 OT R and = 1). Expression (10) then reduces to
Output volatility does not depend on . Since the variances of F DI and OT R are the same and the correlation is one, there is essentially no di¤erence between F DI and OT R and hence the share of F DI is irrelevant. In this case, higher F DI (or OT R) volatility translates into higher output volatility.
Case 2: Variances of F DI and OT R are the same, = 0:5, and there is a perfect negative correlation (i.e., 2 F DI = 2 OT R and = 1). In this case, 2 Y = 0. This can be thought of as the "full insurance"case. Due to the perfectly negative correlation, equal variances, and equal share, total capital in ‡ows are constant and hence output volatility is zero.
Case 3. Variances of F DI and OT R are the same and the correlation is zero (i.e., 2 F DI = 2 OT R and = 0). In this case, expression (10) reduces to
This is the typical benchmark in basic portfolio theory. Think of an investor with two uncertain sources of income (F DI and OT R) that have the same variance but are uncorrelated. What is the share of F DI that would minimize the volatility of the overall portfolio? Set 2 F DI = 2 OT R and = 0 in (10) and di¤erentiate with respect to to obtain,
This expression is zero for = 1=2 and, as can easily be checked, the second derivative is positive indicating the existence of a minimum. In order words, with two uncorrelated sources of income that have the same variance, splitting the portfolio in half minimizes the overall volatility.
Deviating marginally from = 1=2 has, of course, no …rst-order e¤ect on output volatility. For values of 6 = 1=2, however, increasing if > 1=2 or reducing if < 1=2
will increase output volatility because the shares are getting farther away from the variance-minimizing mix. Formally:
Figure 1 illustrates this case by plotting 2 Y as a function of for = 0 and F DI = OT R = 30. We can see that, as equation (23) indicates, the variance-minimizing value of is 0.5 (point A). Given the U-shape of the curve, moving away from point A in either direction increases 2 Y . Point B indicates the median value of in our sample; 0.31. For any between this value and 0:5, increasing will reduce output variability.
What happens if we deviate from this benchmark portfolio case in terms of being di¤erent from zero or variances not being the same? Cases 4 and 5 study these deviations from Case 3.
Case 4. Variances are the same but is di¤erent from zero (i.e., 2 F DI = 2 OT R and
If the correlation is not zero, then it will still be the case that the value of that minimizes output volatility is one-half. Indeed, set 2 F DI = 2 OT R in equation (10) and di¤erentiate with respect to to obtain
which is zero for = 1=2. Intuitively -and as (10) makes clear -a positive correlation increases overall volatility relative to the = 0 case but does not change the fact that, since F DI and OT R are not perfectly correlated, the variance-minimizing is still one-half.
Case 5. Correlation is zero but variances are di¤erent (i.e., = 0 and 2
In this case, the variance-minimizing will change. To see this, set = 0 in (10) and di¤erentiate with respect to to obtain
Setting this expression to zero, we obtain the variance-minimizing value of :
If 2 F DI < 2 OT R , then min > 1=2. Intuitively, if F DI is less volatile than OT R, then it would be optimal to hold more than one-half of the T F as F DI. Even though the variance-minimizing is larger than one-half, the same intuition developed in Case 3 above holds: deviating from this variance-minimizing value of will increase overall volatility.
Needless to say, in practice countries cannot choose the variance-minimizing value of . 9
But all the intuition developed so far will still help us in thinking about the data. As an illustration, Figure 2 plots equation (10) for the case of Turkey in which F DI = 58:8, OT R = 168:5, and = 0:23. 10 In this case, the variance-minimizing value of is 0.85, given by point A. Given the U-shape of the curve, moving away from point A in either direction increases 2 Y . Point B is the actual value of for Turkey, = 0:14. Since this value of is less than the variance-minimizing , increasing will reduce output volatility. This will be one of the main empirical predictions of our model.
Returning now to the general case captured in equation (10), let us examine how changes in , 2 F DI , and 2 OT R a¤ect output volatility. Taking the corresponding partial derivatives, we obtain
As equation (16) (17) and (18) indicate that the e¤ects of 2 F DI and 2 OT R are ambiguous.
To understand this ambiguity, think of the case in which = 1, = 0:5, and F DI < OT R .
9 Even though we could certainly interpret various measures that emerging countries often adopt to encourage F DI at the expense of other, more volatile, ‡ows as an attempt to increase and reduce output volatility.
1 0 See the data section below for the interpretation of the units in which the standard deviations of F DI and OT R are expressed. 11 Equation (17) then reduces to
Here a reduction in F DI volatility would increase output volatility. Intuitively, with perfect negative correlation between foreign direct investment and portfolio and other investments and F DI < OT R , F DI volatility is actually a good thing because then F DI can o¤er more insurance against OT R. In other words, if F DI exhibits very low volatility, then it cannot o¤set the much higher volatility of OT R.
In the data, however, is on average close to zero (sample median is 0.05), in which case an increase in the volatility of either F DI or OT R will increase output volatility. Intuitively, with zero correlation, higher volatility is unambiguously bad because it contributes to output volatility directly without o¤ering any insurance.
To summarize, the main predictions of our empirical model are as follows:
Output volatility should be an increasing function of F DI volatility and OT R volatility (under the assumption that 0).
Output volatility should be a decreasing function of the share of F DI in total capital in ‡ows (under the assumption that the actual value of is below the variance-minimizing value of The standard deviations and correlations of all variables are computed based on their cyclical components. For this purpose, we use the Hodrick-Prescott …lter with a smoothing parameter of 6.5 (Ravn and Uhlig, 2002) . Since the cyclical component is expressed in terms of percentage deviations of the actual value from the trend, the corresponding standard deviation is also expressed in those terms. For example, the volatility of F DI mentioned above for Turkey ( F DI = 58:8) means that, on average, the level of F DI is 58.8 percentage points away from its trend. Given that OT R = 168:5 for Turkey, this implies that portfolio and other investments are almost three times as volatile as F DI.
Another common practice in the literature (see, for instance, Albuquerque, Loayza, and Serven, 2005) is to normalize capital ‡ows such as F DI by dividing them by GDP. The rationale behind this methodology is to control for country size and avoid nonstationarity problems. While helpful in a di¤erent context, we feel that this normalization would not be appropriate in our case because the volatility of such a ratio would capture the volatility of both F DI and output. Since the latter will be our dependent variable, our empirical analysis would su¤er from endogeneity problems by construction. Moreover, our focus on the cyclical component of capital in ‡ows avoids nonstationarity problems altogether. Notice also that because we measure the cyclical component in terms of percentage deviations of the actual value from the trend, our volatility measures are independent of the size of the economy or capital in ‡ows. Indeed, using cross-country data, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the correlation between F DI and average F DI, as well as the correlation between OT R and average OT R, are equal to zero at a 5 percent signi…cance level.
We now turn to a broad look at the data. In particular, we focus on volatility and basic statistics discussed in the previous section. Figure 3 shows output volatility. 13 While output volatility varies substantially across countries, the median is almost twice as large in developing countries as in industrial countries. Figure 4 shows total gross in ‡ows volatility.
Not surprisingly, the median of total gross in ‡ows into developing countries is more than one and a half times that of industrial countries. 14 We now turn to the volatilities of F DI and OT R. Figure 5 shows the ratio of OT R volatility to F DI volatility. The …gure is consistent with the idea in the literature that OT R in ‡ows are more volatile than F DI in ‡ows. Indeed, the ratio is larger than one for more than 85 percent of the countries in our sample. The median volatility of OT R is close to 120, compared to less than half (about 44) for F DI. Moreover, the median in developing countries ratios is 76 percent higher than that in industrial economies, re ‡ecting in particular the higher volatility of OT R. In fact, the median F DI volatility is 48 for industrial counties and 41
for developing countries. In sharp contrast, the median OT R volatility is about 30 percent higher in developing countries than in advanced economies (120 for developing countries and 85 for industrial countries). Figure 6 shows that the share of F DI in total gross capital in ‡ows is typically quite low, with the sample median being 0.32. Indeed, for more than 60 percent of the countries, the share is less than 0.5. Furthermore, the median share is three times as high in developing countries as in industrial countries. Finally, Figure 7 depicts the correlation between OT R and F DI. We can see wide variation in this …gure across countries, with the sample median being 0.05 and the median for developing countries -0.02.
Taking into account the median values of the ratio of OT R volatility to F DI volatility and the correlation between OT R and F DI for industrial and developing countries, we …nd that the (i.e., the share of F DI in total capital in ‡ows) that minimizes output volatility (i.e., expression 10) is 0.7 and 0.8 for industrial and developing countries, respectively. These values are much higher than the actual ones: 0.15 for industrial economies and 0.45 for developing countries. The di¤erence in the optimal shares of F DI re ‡ects the fact that (i) the relative ratio of OT R volatility to F DI volatility is higher in developing countries than in industrial ones (3.7 versus 2.1) and (ii) the correlation between OT R and F DI is positive (0.14) for industrial countries but slightly negative (-0.02) for developing countries. In other words, a higher share of F DI in total capital in ‡ows is more bene…cial for developing countries than for industrial economies because (i) it reduces total capital ‡ows volatility directly by substituting a more volatile source of capital (OT R) for one that is less volatile (F DI) and (ii) it provides some insurance given the negative (though rather small) correlation.
Empirical evidence
In this section we test the main empirical implications derived in Section 2. First, output volatility should depend positively on F DI and OT R volatility. Second, output volatility
should be an increasing function of the correlation between F DI and OT R. Third, for low values of the F DI share, output volatility should be a decreasing function of the share of F DI in total capital in ‡ows. 15 We …rst show our benchmark regressions that link output volatility to the variables highlighted in the empirical model of Section 2. We then control for other variables that, in practice, could a¤ect output variability. We then address endogeneity problems.
Basic regressions
Following the empirical growth literature, we use non-overlapping …ve-year averages. Table 1 reports the basic results using country and …ve-year …xed e¤ects. Standard errors are robust and we also allow for within-country correlation (i.e., clustered by country). We normalize F DI and OT R to be between 0 and 100 to make regression coe¢ cients easier to read. 16
Columns 1-5 test the key implications of our model one variable at a time and column 6 tests them all together.
Results are as predicted by our model. Higher F DI and OT R volatility increase output 1 5 In principle, one would like to evaluate the interaction e¤ects in a more elaborated way (i.e., by introducing all neccesary interaction terms). Sample size, however, severely restricts our ability to follow such an approach. 1 6 After the normalization, F DI and OT R range between 0 and 14.89 and 0.04 and 100, respectively. 16 volatility (columns 1 and 2). A higher correlation between F DI and OT R increases output volatility (column 3). When we include the share of F DI in total capital in ‡ows (column 4), it appears not to matter, contrary to our model's prediction. However, as captured by (23)- (14), the expected relationship between a higher share of F DI in total in ‡ows and lower output volatility tends to occur when the share is small or, to be precise, smaller than optimal.
In the particular case of equal variances and zero correlation, an increase in the share of F DI will reduce output volatility when the initial share is smaller than 0.5 (see equation (14)). To capture this e¤ect, we interact this term with a dummy variable that equals one when the share is smaller than the sample median share (0.32). Column 5 shows that, indeed, after introducing this distinction, output volatility is a decreasing function of the share of F DI in total capital in ‡ows only when its initial value is low. Finally, when all explanatory variables are included (column 6), the size of the coe¢ cients and signi…cance levels remain essentially unchanged.
Controlling for other determinants of output volatility
Having established that output volatility depends on the factors predicted by the portfolio model developed in Section 2, we now proceed to control for other factors that could also a¤ect output volatility. While the basic regressions of Subsection 4.1 control for country and …ve-year …xed e¤ects, other factors such as idiosyncratic external shocks, …scal policy volatility, and country instability could also a¤ect output volatility.
Fiscal policy volatility is measured using the standard deviation of the cyclical component of government spending. We proxy external shocks volatility using the standard deviation of the cyclical component of terms of trade. Country instability is measured using the average of internal and external con ‡icts from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Internal con ‡ict refers to political violence within the country and its actual or potential impact on governance. The risk rating assigned is composed of three subcomponents: civil war/coup threat, terrorism/political violence, and civil disorder. External con ‡ict refers to the risk to the incumbent government from foreign action, ranging from non-violent external pressure (diplomatic pressures, withholding of aid, trade restrictions, territorial disputes, sanctions, and so forth) to violent external pressure (ranging from cross-border con ‡icts to all-out war).
The risk rating assigned is composed of three subcomponents: war, cross-border con ‡ict, and foreign pressures. We normalized this variable so that it varies between 0 and 100, with a low value indicating low risk.
Results are reported in Table 2 . Columns 1 to 3 show the e¤ects of the control variables one at a time. The three variables have the expected signs: higher …scal and terms of trade volatility and more country instability increase output volatility. Surprisingly enough, however, terms of trade volatility is not statistically signi…cant. The reason is that we are also including …ve-year …xed e¤ects. If such …xed e¤ects are not included, then the coe¢ cient of the terms of trade volatility is positive and signi…cant at the 5 percent level. We thus conclude that, while there is some country idiosyncratic variation over time, an important fraction of terms of trade volatility is common to most countries. This is re ‡ected, for instance in the When including all controls (column 4), …scal policy volatility becomes insigni…cant due to its high correlation with country instability. 17 More importantly for our purposes, Column 6 indicates that the size and signi…cance of our four explanatory variables (F DI volatility, OT R volatility, correlation between F DI and OT R, and interacted share of F DI) remain essentially unchanged relative to column 6 in Table 1 .
Addressing endogeneity
This section addresses potential endogeneity problems. One could reasonably argue that the positive relationship between output volatility and F DI and OT R volatility may re ‡ect the fact that higher GDP volatility increases the volatility of capital in ‡ows. In other words, the causality may run from output volatility to in ‡ows volatility rather than the other way around. In the same vein, reductions in the share of F DI could re ‡ect the reluctance of foreign …rms to invest for the long-term in highly volatile economies.
As is the case in the empirical macro literature that has assessed the in ‡uence of F DI on economic growth (see, for instance, Lensink and Morrisey, 2001 and Alfaro, 2003) , we lack obvious instruments for F DI , OT R , (F DI; OT R), and F DI share. We then use three sets of instruments. First, we follow the above-mentioned macro literature in using lagged F DI as an instrument for current F DI. In our case, this amounts to using the lagged …ve-year average of each portfolio variable as an instrument. For example, we use the OT R for the period 1970-1974 to instrument for the period [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] . The Spearman's rank correlation between F DI and its lagged …ve-year value is 0.38. The corresponding correlation is 0.26 for OT R and 0.30 for F DI share. In all cases, the correlation is statistically signi…cant at the 5 percent level. In other words, there seems to be a positive association between the volatilities of capital in ‡ows over time, even at the …ve-year frequency. Unfortunately, the correlation 1 7 The correlation is 0.40 and statistically di¤erent from zero at the one percent level.
19 between (F DI; OT R) and its lagged …ve-year value is statistically insigni…cant.
Our second set of instruments uses a geographical/gravity approach aimed at capturing the in ‡uence of regional e¤ects. Capital in ‡ows respond to economic and political fundamentals which are often shared by di¤erent countries within a region (Calvo and Reinhart, 1996; Fernandez-Arias and Montiel, 1995; Alba, Bhattacharya, Claessens, Gosh, and Hernández, 2000; Corbo and Hernández, 2001) . During the 1980s, for example, Latin America experienced such political and economic instability that international investors became reluctant to invest for the long-term. Indeed, F DI share was just 0.24 for Latin America during the 1980s, compared to 0.51 during the 1990s, and almost 0.75 during the 2000s. To exploit this geographical dimension, we instrument each portfolio variable using the following expression:
where I ij represents the portfolio variable and dist ij measures the distance between the capital cities of countries i and j. In other words, we instrument a country's …ve-year observation of each portfolio variable with the weighted sum of such variable for other countries. The weight for each other country decreases with its distance. This gravity approach is thus a more generalized version of the idea behind regional e¤ects. The Spearman's rank correlation between (F DI; OT R) and the suggested geographical instrument is 0.35 and statistically signi…cant at the 5 percent level. The gravity approach proves to be a good strategy to predict the patterns of correlation between F DI and OT R. Unfortunately, the correlations for the other portfolio variables are statistically insigni…cant.
To complement the two previous sets of instruments, we also rely on the literature regard-20 ing the determinants of capital ‡ows. In particular we focus on determinants that may help determine portfolio variables, but not have a direct e¤ect on output. Montiel and Reinhart (1999) …nd that, by imposing capital controls, countries are able to increase the share of F DI.
Generally speaking, policies that punish short-term ‡ows should, in principle, induce foreign investors to increase long-term ‡ows. We use three variables to account for this e¤ect. First, we use the Chinn-Ito index (Chinn and Ito, 2006) to measure de jure …nancial openness. This index, which measures a country's capital account openness, is based on a binary dummy variable that codi…es the tabulation of restrictions on cross-border …nancial transactions reported in the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.
A high value of this index is an indication of low de jure …nancial integration. Second, we use the ratio of total foreign assets and liabilities to GDP from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) to measure de facto …nancial integration. A high value of this index indicates a high degree of de facto …nancial integration. Lastly, we use the investment pro…le index from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). This investment pro…le assesses factors a¤ecting the risk to investment that are not covered by other political, economic, and …nancial risk components. The risk rating assigned is composed of three subcomponents: contract viability/expropriation, pro…ts repatriation, and payment delays. We normalized this variable so that it ranges between 0 and 100, with a low (high) value indicating low (high) risk. We use the …ve-year lag of these three variables to take care of reverse causality concerns (i.e. ,the possibility that output volatility leads to investment risk). The Spearman's rank correlation between F DI share and the …ve-year lag of the Chinn-Ito index is -0.14, while the correlation with the …ve-year lag of investment pro…le is 0.18. In both cases, the correlation is statistically signi…cant at the 5 percent level. These …ndings support Montiel and Reinhart's (1999) arguments. Moreover, in line with the rationale behind some recent policy measures in countries such as Brazil, more capital controls (i.e., lower de jure …nancial openness) reduce OT R . The Spearman's rank correlation between OT R and the …ve-year lag of the Chinn-Ito index is statistically signi…cant and equal to -0.19.
Having checked that the proposed sets of instruments seem to be good predictors for the variables they are instrumenting for, we proceed to estimate instrumental variables regressions. Table 3 shows the instrumental variable regressions. In all cases we cannot reject the overidenti…cation tests at a 5 percent con…dence level. The instruments are valid instruments (i.e., uncorrelated with the error term) and the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. Moreover, as suggested by the discussion above, instrumental variable regressions con…rm that in almost all cases the excluded instruments are not weak instruments (i.e., they are strongly correlated with the endogenous regressors). Column 1 shows that our previous empirical …ndings hold. The only exception is OT R : while the sign of the coe¢ cient is positive, it is not statistically signi…cant. 18 We now add control variables. While terms of trade volatility is typically treated as exogenous, this is certainly not the case of government spending volatility and country instability.
Indeed, it seems reasonable to argue that higher output volatility might increase government spending volatility and lead to more instability. To account for this potential reverse causality, we use the …ve-year lag of government spending volatility and country instability. The
Spearman's rank correlation between government spending and its …ve-year lag is 0.56 and the corresponding correlation for country instability is 0.84. In both cases, the correlation is statistically signi…cant at the 5 percent level. Columns 2 to 4 show the results of including each determinant one at a time. Column 5 includes all portfolio and control variables. The inclusion of these determinants does not change the main results reported in column 1.
Conclusions
A commonly-held belief is that a larger share of F DI in total capital in ‡ows will reduce output volatility. There is, however, little, if any, formal evidence on this channel. Based on standard portfolio theory, we …rst develop a simple econometric model that calls attention to some important caveats. In particular, lower F DI volatility will reduce output volatility only if the correlation between F DI and other ‡ows is positive (which is not always the case in the data). Also, a larger share of F DI will reduce output volatility only if the actual share of F DI is below the variance-minimizing share. Our model thus yields three testable implications: (i) output volatility should depend positively on F DI and OT R volatility; (ii) output volatility should be an increasing function of the correlation between F DI and OT R;
and (iii) output volatility should be a decreasing function of the share of F DI in total capital in ‡ows (when the initial share is low). We …nd strong support in the data for all three implications, even after controlling for other factors that in ‡uence output volatility and for possible endogeneity problems.
Appendix
This appendix develops a simple theoretical model that provides a theoretical illustration of the key assumption in the empirical model -as captured in equation (2) -that there exists a tight link between output and capital in ‡ows. In the theoretical model, such a link will arise endogenously as …rms choose whether to …nance investment with either short-term or long-term external funding. 19 In the aggregate, the economy uses both sources of …nance and changes in, say, the cost of external funding will lead to changes in output, external …nance, and its composition.
Consider a small open economy with a continuum of risk-neutral …rms that produce the same …nal (tradable) good, denoted by q, using the same (tradable) capital, denoted by k.
Firms are indexed by their productivity parameter, (0 < < 1), which is the only source of heterogeneity. Firms "live" for two periods. Firms buy capital before production and hold it for the entire two periods, after which it depreciates completely.
The production function of a …rm is given by
where > 0 is a productivity parameter. By construction, output is constant across periods.
Firms need to borrow from abroad to …nance the purchase of capital. Borrowing can be either short-term or long-term but not a combination of both. Short-term funding (i.e., portfolio investment) requires repayment of principal and interest at the end of the …rst period. Longterm funding (i.e., foreign direct investment) requires repayment of principal plus interest only after two periods. The one-period short-term and long-term interest rates are, respectively, r s and r l . We assume that r s < r l , re ‡ecting the idea that international lenders may have a preference for a more "liquid" asset.
As an important benchmark, we …rst solve the …rm's problem under short-term …nancing and no repayment constraint. We then impose the repayment constraint for short-term …nancing. We then solve for the case of long-term …nancing. We then compare pro…ts in the two cases (short-term …nancing and repayment constraint versus long-term …nancing) to …nd out when a …rm will chose one or the other. We …nally aggregate over all …rms to obtain the economy's aggregate capital stock and output and analyze how the equilibrium changes if the cost of long-term …nancing changes.
Short-term …nancing and no repayment constraint
Denote by p the world relative price of q in terms of k and by b t , t = 0; 1 net foreign assets.
Think of period 0 as the period in which the capital stock is purchased. Periods 1 and 2 are the periods in which the …rm operates (i.e., produces and sells). The ‡ow budget constraints are thus given by
where t , t = 1; 2, denotes dividends paid by the …rm. Combining these ‡ow constraints, we obtain an intertemporal constraint:
is the present discounted value of pro…ts as of time 0.
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Firms choose k to maximize (22). The …rst-order condition for capital takes the form:
At an optimum, the …rm equates the present discounted value of the value of the marginal productivity to the cost of capital. Solving for the capital stock, we obtain
Substituting this expression into (22), we can write pro…ts as:
As expected, pro…ts are positive since, by assumption, 2 (0; 1).
In the absence of any additional constraint, all …rms would choose short-term …nancing because, by assumption, it is cheaper than long-term …nancing. To have a meaningful choice between short-term and long-term …nancing, we will now introduce a repayment constraint.
Short-term …nancing and repayment constraint
Suppose now that a …rm can access short-term credit only if it can pay back the loan at the end of the …rst period. Formally,
Let us check if this repayment constraint binds for the unconstrained problem that we just solved. To this e¤ect, substitute (24) into the last expression to obtain 1 + r s 2 + r s > :
Firms whose satis…es this condition will thus still be able to choose short-term …nancing and remain at the …rst best because the repayment constraint does not bind. Intuitively, low …rms optimally choose a low level of capital (i.e., units of capital with high marginal productivity) and are thus more likely to satisfy constraint (26) given that the repayment cost per unit of capital (1 + r s ) does not depend the level of capital.
On the other hand, the unconstrained solution for …rms with > (1 + r s )=(2 + r s ) violates condition (26). These …rms will thus need to choose between "constrained short-term …nancing" (i.e., choose the optimal level of capital subject to condition (26)) or long-term …nancing. The trade-o¤ is thus between remaining in a …rst-best equilibrium but facing a higher cost of capital (long-term …nancing) or choosing a constrained level of capital but at a lower cost (constrained short-term …nancing).
If constraint (26) binds, then the capital stock is given by
If we compare this level of capital with the unconstrained level of capital, given by expression (24), for a …rm with > (1 + r s )=(2 + r s ), we can see that the stock of capital in the constrained case is lower. In other words, to access short-term …nancing, the …rm needs to have a suboptimally low level of capital to generate enough pro…ts in the …rst period to repay 27 the loan.
Maximization under long-term …nancing
Let us now compute pro…ts under long-term …nancing. The budget constraints remain the same as in (19)- (21) with r l in lieu of r s . Further, since a …rm that chooses long-term …nancing is still operating in a …rst-best world, the choice of capital will be given by condition (24) with r l in lieu of r s . Pro…ts will thus be given by (25) with the corresponding choice of capital.
Comparison
Firms with > (1 + r s )=(2 + r s ) will choose long-term …nancing over short-term …nancing as long as pro…ts are larger:
Using equations (24) and (25), this condition reduces to
Suppose to …x ideas that r l = r s . In this case, this last expression reduces to
Since the choice is only relevant for …rms with > (1 + r s ) = (2 + r s ), the condition will always hold. In other words, if r l = r s , then all these …rms would choose long-term …nancing 28 because the cost is the same as short-term …nancing but they are not subject to the repayment constraint (which, by construction, is binding).
But our maintained assumption is, of course, that r l > r s . In that case, condition (28), holding with equality, de…nes a threshold value of , denoted by , which is given by
We now establish the following result:
Claim 1 Firms with ( < ) will choose long-term (short-term) …nancing.
Proof. Consider condition (28). Di¤ erentiating the right-hand side and evaluating the corresponding expression at = , we obtain
Set = in condition (28). By construction, it will hold as an equality. An increase in will then reduce the RHS, which means that long-term pro…ts will be higher than constrained short-term pro…ts. The reverse is true for a fall in .
Intuitively, …rms with a large (i.e., > ) are …rms that …nd it more e¢ cient to operate on a larger scale (and thus would be hurt more by the repayment constraint) and hence would be willing to pay the higher cost of long-term …nancing in order to not be subject to the repayment constraint. In contrast, smaller …rms (i.e., …rms with < ) would rather not pay the additional cost of …nancing and choose a second-best level of capital.
From (29), we can see that increases with r l and decreases with r s . Intuitively, an increase in r l makes long-term …nancing more expensive. As a result, marginal …rms will choose to switch to short-term …nancing (i.e., increases). Conversely, an increase in r s makes short-term …nancing more expensive and hence marginal …rms will choose to switch to long-term …nancing (i.e., decreases).
Aggregation
As has been established above, there are three types of …rms in this economy depending on the value of :
The range 0 < 1+r s 2+r s consists of …rms that are operating in a …rst-best world with short-term …nancing.
The range 1+r s 2+r s < consists of …rms that are operating under constrained shortterm …nancing (i.e., these are …rms that would violate the repayment constraint if they chose the …rst-best level of capital).
The range < < 1 consists of …rms that are operating with long-term …nancing.
Aggregate capita and output are thus given by, respectively,
where~ (1 + r s )= (2 + r s ). 20
Since the …rst two types of …rms buy capital with short-term borrowing (denote it by P OR), while the last type of …rm buys it with long term borrowing (denote it by F DI), we can write
We thus have an economy with heterogeneous …rms in which the composition of external …nancing is endogenously determined based on each …rm's productivity and the cost of shortterm and long-term …nancing. This gives us a simple framework to ask how a change in the cost of long-term …nancing changes the equilibrium.
Changes in the cost of long-term …nancing
What are the e¤ects of a change in r l ? Speci…cally, suppose that r l is lower; how does the equilibrium described above change? 21
Using Leibniz rule, we can compute the changes in capital and output from equations (30) 2 0 In our model, …rms hold no initial capital so the capital stock can be thought of as investment …nanced, as made clear below, by POR and FDI.
2 1 Technically, we are solving for the same perfect foresight path for di¤erent values of r l . This can be interpreted as either two economies with di¤erent values of r l or, more appropriately for our purposes, as an unanticipated change in r l at the beginning of a third period in which the economy goes through the same cycle.
and (31), respectively:
Capital and output thus increase. Intuitively, a fall in r l a¤ects capital and output through two channels:
From (29), we can see that a higher r l reduces . This means that some marginal …rms that were relying on short-term …nancing will switch to long-term …nancing. At the margin, however, the capital stock of these …rms does not change and thus output is not a¤ected. 22 The capital stock (and thus output) of …rms that rely on long-term …nancing increases.
What happens to F DI and P OR?
In absolute terms, F DI increases and P OR falls. The share of F DI also increases because F DI increases by more than total capital in ‡ows (given that P OR falls). Intuitively, F DI increases for two reasons. First, …rms that relied on long-term …nancing are now borrowing 2 2 To see that capital does not change, notice that expression (24), with r l in lieu of r s and evaluated at = , is the same as equation (27). 32 more. Second, some marginal …rms that were relying on P OR have now switched to F DI.
The change in F DI is thus larger than the change in the capital stock.
It would be easy to accommodate random changes in r l in our model as long as …rms continue to be risk-neutral. In that case, uncertainty regarding changes in r l (or r s for that matter) would not change the …rms' behavior derived above (with the expected value of r l and r s replacing the actual values). We could imagine that every third period r l is drawn from some distribution and the above equilibrium materializes. In such a scenario, an increase in the volatility of r l would lead to higher volatility in output, investment, F DI, P OR, and the respective shares. Clearly, being endogenous, the higher volatility of capital in ‡ows or F DI is not "causing" higher output volatility. Rather they are both endogenous responses to the higher volatility in the cost of long-term …nancing. Note: Regressions include country and five-year fixed effects. t-statistics are reported in brackets. Standard errors are robust and allow for withincountry correlation (i.e., clustered by country). R² in all regressions corresponds to within-country R². Constant and low share dummy coefficients are not reported. ×, *, **, and *** indicate statistically significance at the 15%, 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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